天天爱天天做天天做天天吃中文|久久综合给久合久久综合|亚洲视频一区二区三区|亚洲国产综合精品2022

  • 
    
    <delect id="ixd07"></delect>

       找回密碼
       注冊(cè)

      QQ登錄

      只需一步,快速開始

      NT的密碼究竟放在哪

      [復(fù)制鏈接]
      1#
      發(fā)表于 2011-1-12 21:01:17 | 只看該作者 |倒序?yàn)g覽 |閱讀模式
      根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡單加密形式包含在一個(gè)文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個(gè)不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個(gè)地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100
      $ G7 l$ K& ~4 i3 ~, W3 h( i9 X' U4 h+ P
      From: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>' W/ Q/ m' h- [, o- g& O
      & _! J5 |; s- L7 ~0 S( Y
      To: sans@clark.net
      1 p6 I* M5 c' H7 S, Q6 q% NSubject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords5 u# `! D6 ~8 W# L/ N+ z6 k
      Hi all,) ^7 l' q) c& p9 B% s
      We knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across' K, E) m9 E) {, j
      the system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.
      5 i, C* s% g$ j2 P4 wIIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can
      - C" i" L& f; }+ T, A9 f  f, \be compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,  i! B" @2 V, _+ _$ Z$ ^
      Keys and Values. It is stored in the following file:) B% {5 O+ g( i5 g, y) g. v. s4 u
      C:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin
      0 |1 Y6 a% W; L( `5 q; Z( jThe IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:
      0 P( w6 ]! o8 ?- F1 J9 s# @; c' S- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the
      - O4 U% z$ ^( O" GMMC)# K+ k5 O& _1 I9 G9 _& p
      - IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)
      6 J4 V3 r# H( H# `0 o- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of  l* M# h1 t1 b0 w7 c) ]3 ^
      your virtual directories is located there./ b- d" e: u7 C: h7 s5 ]' G$ m
      - The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called: g1 c7 r- ~2 T8 u8 h0 u- q
      "HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).; `3 m- y0 x: W
      Note that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are
      ( a8 [7 X7 T3 }srambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM
      + }; D5 ^; \) w2 S8 whave permissions on this file.
      & N8 ^# C+ N9 N# NBUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print0 P3 z/ n" [5 R6 ]* d
      these passwords in CLEAR TEXT.( |- |8 m! x1 U& m
      The user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a4 M3 Q5 L8 E$ t
      malicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.9 U7 K* h( D& q" c5 U7 J3 n" `
      Obviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow, \0 I3 y) F* ~) e9 X
      logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the
      9 Q& F/ r9 A" D7 ]3 r! n6 Aproblem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:
      ! h0 J1 J- P. O  |" {1 [) l' A"
      ' }1 W% G" v( p6 Y0 fIIS 4.0 Metabase7 W+ Z7 R& L& m) o5 H
      ?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr
      1 y+ v$ X' t: R" s7 }3 m5 g--- UNC User ---8 J+ R. z' f8 f* W9 r+ o* @
      UNC User name: 'Lou'
      2 p1 g& r2 q3 b' M: W  i* xUNC User password: 'Microsoft'- u+ v3 _8 F  r3 {0 x* T4 M
      UNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'' B- P! W& L) V  h
      --- Anonymous User ---3 e& h0 j$ p' q
      Anonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'9 r& f1 Y, g6 [1 ~! s9 V3 O
      Anonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'
      ' W0 j. x  h8 GPassword synchronization: 'False'
      * ~9 g8 B, g3 `3 O% J--- IIS Logs DSN User ---- _2 }5 i/ [& T: \
      ODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'
      ) Q, n. X4 C; W+ g6 b9 B: iODBC table name: 'InternetLog'
      ; B# l& C" D2 ^3 w8 R% xODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'
      2 |" I! @- i. L; u* u7 [7 v8 OODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'. W7 q7 l8 ]/ m8 |* ~
      --- Web Applications User ---7 h0 Z% U! v. s' B; F8 X
      WAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'
      9 I3 A0 S; r7 K: TWAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'; p; Z  R9 T9 f1 s
      Default Logon Domain: ''5 @* m) O1 S) o3 K0 e
      ": ^* j3 O( B" b
      For example, you can imagine the following scenario:
      6 K: X' i/ E! V& `A user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say
      / b+ A  {3 H3 u; P7 dserver (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example
      % A  b3 t9 U' uan IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts
      / n( p' H3 ]+ u, K+ j% Pthe login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual
      4 ~6 b2 a9 }* _  Z, u: Z  ~directory located on another server, say (b).- r8 R5 `9 C) z7 Z+ d8 k0 P* g
      Now, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).
        }& J. |9 I6 q$ P9 cAnd so forth...+ M& ]+ J4 ]) g1 g6 _1 S! @
      Microsoft was informed of this vulnerability.. V( e4 m* v4 {) z3 [
      _______________________________________________________________________
      - v" [% A6 W( k& ?) n  PPatrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr$ r4 L( {- p5 d% F# `
      MCP NT 4.0
      * z1 b; R8 I. ?" P! D! f. r  S4 wInternet, Security and Microsoft solutions7 |6 K2 }  B& I* x$ A
      e-business Services
      " \9 R0 K3 Y( W5 v6 CIBM Global Services
      ( V. W8 H/ n8 [7 n7 f
      您需要登錄后才可以回帖 登錄 | 注冊(cè)

      本版積分規(guī)則

      QQ|本地廣告聯(lián)系: QQ:905790666 TEL:13176190456|Archiver|手機(jī)版|小黑屋|汶上信息港 ( 魯ICP備19052200號(hào)-1 )

      GMT+8, 2025-6-28 03:28

      Powered by Discuz! X3.5

      © 2001-2025 Discuz! Team.

      快速回復(fù) 返回頂部 返回列表