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      NT的密碼究竟放在哪

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      發(fā)表于 2011-1-12 21:01:17 | 只看該作者 |倒序?yàn)g覽 |閱讀模式
      根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡單加密形式包含在一個文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100! B9 q8 ~6 M0 H, i: k! z$ t

      - M% P( @/ s' f5 ?  w6 G2 WFrom: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>5 t4 n1 ]( U# E' M9 O2 {
      1 T6 p* k# F6 ~  @# }
      To: sans@clark.net& z* Q, B% w& q* E, l
      Subject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords& \3 I0 o' W' a9 o  B+ I
      Hi all,
      7 k& e9 f; y7 z6 jWe knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across
      ( Z$ a' v5 ^( ]the system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.4 k8 b( L6 `3 o& s! x* B4 ]0 P
      IIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can# |0 F  Q9 x, e% v2 _' c; ]
      be compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,
      $ Q: R* Q( {3 xKeys and Values. It is stored in the following file:% ]" I# I! A( h5 I! B7 I3 Q3 u
      C:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin" E3 f" g8 o; C$ e" X/ x' n
      The IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:
        ]: U( ~/ ~7 B% o3 ^' m- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the- W2 T$ F/ P  U. c/ N& `. d2 m
      MMC)
      5 }; u" u, n  R6 r! h& B- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !): [/ ]( y7 A" C% M% l" G( B6 @
      - UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of) l5 y4 K( {. f5 X8 A, t
      your virtual directories is located there.
      0 x* J' v& _/ ~$ ~/ e1 P: O- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called
      - e7 g+ E! ^2 g"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).
      7 }3 ]5 T$ D' Z  }Note that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are  T% E' A. L( A( x5 q
      srambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM
      + E2 U$ \! ]# R- Vhave permissions on this file.; O/ H! K% M4 t, c
      BUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print- w+ K" U: d4 E
      these passwords in CLEAR TEXT.
      6 j- t8 S' ]  o; j: eThe user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a
      ( [# h3 ~; R& M. U( G0 gmalicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.; G2 O% n' m. ^% v
      Obviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow
      - Q* j$ x6 s1 a+ S: r' k9 D1 @logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the0 {; M9 i; C# ~- V8 t2 }
      problem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:% |) I! s# F6 }/ n& f  J
      "
      1 b7 f# n( G8 [( F8 W$ C3 kIIS 4.0 Metabase
      5 @4 a) I9 L. |7 Y1 U% I% H?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr1 A* F* J6 f; v+ g2 Y5 i6 ~
      --- UNC User ---- Y+ l4 P8 P. `! @& K% I! i) s
      UNC User name: 'Lou'" J/ V; {! w8 p) G; E
      UNC User password: 'Microsoft'
      ; i- [5 C1 L: _UNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'
      ' e( e7 Y4 b4 s! N4 M--- Anonymous User ---5 L8 c0 k. p+ v! k* @5 N3 X# Y
      Anonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'
      # C+ ~  h/ n4 _- EAnonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'+ M, Y! o1 E1 w
      Password synchronization: 'False'
      " A! `3 M9 }* ]+ e--- IIS Logs DSN User ---
      / j4 c9 x8 y6 S0 UODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'/ a) d+ C6 f1 S% Y0 e& u
      ODBC table name: 'InternetLog': D3 E1 @6 C9 G5 C# v! C7 b# M+ [
      ODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'
      9 x( ]- V7 C! v- S; BODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'
      2 {5 c% H% g9 v9 H) t- h' b- o/ L--- Web Applications User ---  e( t1 x0 \# b7 v
      WAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'9 N2 M* ]# M# e) F% a
      WAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'
      # I1 n/ Y" ?: W/ YDefault Logon Domain: ''
      8 R# \$ J$ k8 W; ^8 |"
      . @6 {1 F% v9 D8 i* UFor example, you can imagine the following scenario:0 w+ k$ _# r. i  }+ N" O0 J6 _
      A user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say$ a% P7 Q! F5 X3 }" ^4 X7 Z) N
      server (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example
      " [. @2 S7 e  [. S* r+ _7 p+ yan IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts
      : y2 o1 g/ D, x% Q6 o, h" F8 _the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual5 W6 y, r! D* v& t& r
      directory located on another server, say (b).2 h+ _5 B8 Q* N' G# H: H9 U
      Now, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).
      ) r" U5 {* t* @, E6 hAnd so forth...
      9 H8 P* z( U5 f8 E( J+ T7 A- sMicrosoft was informed of this vulnerability.6 S4 y5 C1 S6 O* A! K- O0 n
      _______________________________________________________________________/ z2 h7 l& D' D  d9 x
      Patrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr
      6 w- }  t& g: y7 A: YMCP NT 4.0
      7 z! r5 p$ J: x$ ~% aInternet, Security and Microsoft solutions
      : e8 B) n( Y* F0 ie-business Services% W: {1 h$ x5 n. O
      IBM Global Services
      # J) d( v' N+ ^5 Y% G
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