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      NT的密碼究竟放在哪

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      發(fā)表于 2011-1-12 21:01:17 | 只看該作者 |倒序瀏覽 |閱讀模式
      根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡單加密形式包含在一個文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100: P, _- H3 @7 {" v' C
      ' G& ?( C9 c/ s2 _' Q& a: g
      From: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>
        V( o) |1 Q; a
      + m- k$ o6 i* k5 o+ H" m  RTo: sans@clark.net
      : y$ h( R' r. {1 d5 D+ Y% BSubject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords
      7 H. B+ Y5 j/ K, ?Hi all,
      $ t) ]2 d8 j, J2 H. h& p! }/ `We knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across0 m  X0 V4 _) B. G
      the system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.: G2 R) Z+ \3 J. y
      IIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can
      # Q: H5 t9 k' w8 c. s; i3 Q$ Vbe compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,
      1 y6 e) @( O% H( A. }( z; k8 j% ~Keys and Values. It is stored in the following file:1 o, ~& e; i/ Q1 H
      C:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin
      1 i  G5 g& C) J; e  ZThe IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:! k; H# P9 ?' g) S
      - IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the9 t: v6 U. q  V$ j8 N/ k! v
      MMC)
      , |9 h5 R/ L* `- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !); p3 k2 Z2 p' l, q4 k& |% f
      - UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of/ X: l& p9 o9 D/ r- b! I0 q
      your virtual directories is located there.! m* |3 s# c: @7 N
      - The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called6 o: _- D4 a5 A" O; q
      "HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).$ }# q7 p0 }$ T3 G# L
      Note that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are3 T4 ^/ u2 I( i: T0 u) S
      srambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM4 Y+ _) l: c$ L; @; `9 ?
      have permissions on this file.
      , [* r2 ~3 d# L7 G( Q! C. MBUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print
      % N+ ^% [2 n8 Z, U8 z, pthese passwords in CLEAR TEXT.
      6 G/ b# c$ h: |$ l4 \4 zThe user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a; t) h; g/ m( k2 E  K8 e/ U
      malicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.
      $ B6 o  b7 ~8 e% t' S: EObviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow  E* W! r, r' |3 A4 {8 O
      logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the2 q8 A0 f, i8 q3 f! W/ |5 [5 H
      problem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:( R7 N( D/ T8 `) ~- U
      ". Q& ~9 }+ ]& a, ]: V$ T; g, n
      IIS 4.0 Metabase0 F1 A$ E2 L9 w- w
      ?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr
      + ]  j  ^  y2 `& N$ V--- UNC User ---
      6 G1 N  _7 y3 i2 t& s* pUNC User name: 'Lou'
      5 E5 r# y0 v3 D0 dUNC User password: 'Microsoft'
      ( `  _/ k. x0 N1 `UNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'
      4 M5 G- w! D' E3 m--- Anonymous User ---
      8 p4 ^9 |# c& cAnonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'
      5 d+ O9 A% E- c/ B. o7 _& v7 dAnonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'
      ( }0 B# h/ V5 ~% K) o+ _Password synchronization: 'False'
      8 ]1 a- Q$ D1 i) K--- IIS Logs DSN User ---( S. z6 b  [/ E
      ODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG', O( W7 g5 Q9 O6 \6 ]' n' d
      ODBC table name: 'InternetLog'9 \& L  S& `. W2 B- z& }
      ODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'
      4 E" u* F/ X, Q- k$ q! h8 oODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'( s6 }7 |6 k9 H+ F5 P
      --- Web Applications User ---
      : k' d3 k! t6 @9 ?7 u' d, y' iWAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'$ J- A8 x) d+ B1 S& C
      WAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'3 b) D( \5 ^% \0 A/ [$ @0 J) `
      Default Logon Domain: ''5 o! F; ]) ]/ E) Y0 Z& o
      "& G$ v" V+ Y' A& G9 `
      For example, you can imagine the following scenario:
      * j, V7 `6 \, l4 }A user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say7 t: V5 ]. }$ p/ O' L% v& \) w
      server (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example8 m5 N1 V6 U# F# U6 |9 }9 @2 Y* J
      an IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts, ^6 b# s  n1 U0 H$ T
      the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual
      : w& W+ d2 b! e/ d2 M& Kdirectory located on another server, say (b).' V% [" A( o: r7 O5 l$ r1 }
      Now, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).- C, D2 j/ l! W, U' a$ y
      And so forth...' v5 r0 L" p) X& J& y* O! j
      Microsoft was informed of this vulnerability.( S& }! S, P- }- Z  `1 u' R
      _______________________________________________________________________- `, T3 ?" C1 G( @* ]6 c9 `
      Patrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr2 f# n! e. r/ q
      MCP NT 4.0  \" ~- [) u) _9 s; Y8 J4 X: q
      Internet, Security and Microsoft solutions9 N( F0 V- o1 D! E
      e-business Services4 Z" c0 q5 S% B
      IBM Global Services
      6 _# i( z+ x4 {3 Y* y
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